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Abstract 
The division of the national product beMeen capital and labour is an old topic in economic theory but since the ending 
of New Zealand's old system ofnational accounts which were prepared on an income basis, it has been harder to track 
the trends in factor shares in New Zealand. The paper assembles jl.gures to see whether there is any sign that the 
change in political coJ~juncture (and hence potentially the balance of power in the labour market) in the mid-1980s 
had any effect onfactor shares in the product. The hypothesis is that the 1984 election marked the end of a long period 
of relative gains.fOJ·Iabour at the expense o.f'capital, and was followed in thefo/Lowing two decades by a trend in the 
other direction, to which the Employment Contracts Act might have contributed. As usual the numbers speak only 
softly and have to be interpreted with the greatest caution. 
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At the end of the 1970s two papers appeared arguing that 
a rising wage share had put pressure on the profit rate in 
New Zealand, and that this helped to account for the rise 
in unemployment which was a major new phenomenon at 
that time. This triggered a considerable debate among New 
Zealand economists during the 1980s over the relation-
ship between the real wage, labour productivity, unem-
ployment, and economic growth. Most of that debate was 
concerned with the relationship between the real wage and 
unemployment in the short-to-medium term, rather than 
with capital accumulation and long-run growth peifOim-
ance. McDonald ( 1978), however, quoted extensively and 
approvingly from a Swedish study which had argued for 
incomes policy to keep the wage/profit distribution within 
a target ·corridor' over time, given that that 
a shift in the distribution in favour o.f' wage 
earners at the expense o.l business firms ... 
has an effect in the first instance on the 
capacity o.t' enterprises tofinance investment 
for increased productivity and the e.\pansion 
o.t' capacity. . . . [The equity-debt ratio and 
pro_fitability] limit the extellf to which the 
distribution o.f income can be shifted in 
favour of wage earners without leading to 
consequences which in the long run also 
operate adversely for wage earners, in the 
form of a lower rate of economic growth ... 
McDonald's central distributional claim was that the profit 
share of net output had fallen from 36% in the early 1960s 
to only 29% by the second half of the 1970s, while the 
wages and salaries share had risen from 47% to 56% over 
the same period. He acknowledged that a rising tax wedge 
on labour meant that "the increase in Salaries and Wages 
After Tax was much slower .. . and was in line with GDP/ 
NDP growth rates in the 1970s", but for the purposes of 
his main argument he relied on the increasing share of pre-
tax wages and salaries as evidence of a squeeze on profits. 
The relative roles of the real income wage (that is, the 
after-tax wage rate det1ated by the CPI), and the incidence 
of income tax on wage costs, in raising the cost of labour 
to employers in the 1970s was explored further by Bertram 
and Wells ( 1983 ), Easton ( 1983 ), and Bertram ( 1985). The 
data appeared to show that in after-tax terms the wage/ 
salary share of NDP had risen by about five percentage 
points during the tight labour market of the 1950s but 
thereafter had stabilised at around 50%; some upward trend 
had appeared in the Old National Accounts series which 
were discontinued after 1978, but was absent in the new 
SNA accounts that appeared in 1978 and were soon 
backdated to 1962. Both East on ( 1983) and Bertram 
(1985) noted that while the after-tax labour share appeared 
constant, the pre-tax share did not, which raised interesting 
questions about whether 'Bowley's Law' of constant factor 
shares based on the technical parameters of the aggregate 
production function could be applied to New Zealand. 
The perception among policymakers in both Australia and 
New Zealand that some sort of 'profit squeeze' had 
occurred in the 1970s, echoing similar concerns in the UK, 
led to a perceptible change in the political climate in the 
1980s. Thatcher's frontal assault on the trade unions in 
Britain had a somewhat muted echo in New Zealand, 
especially while Labour was in power between 1984-90, 
but organised labour nevertheless was pushed increasingly 
onto the defensive, while policymakers focused openly on 
measures aimed to improve profitability. The Employment 
Contracts Act 199 l marked the high tide of a sustained 
ideological and political offensive by employers against 
the unions; but the turning of the tide that led to the ECA 
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has to be dated much earlier, in the early and mid 1980s 
when Thatcherite views became widespread among New 
Zealand business and policy elites. 
One of the econometric surprises of the 1990s has been 
the lack of clear evidence that the ECA itself actually 
affected labour market outcomes - either real wages or 
unemployment- in any very dramatic way. The hypothesis 
with which I embarked on a new exploration of the factor-
shares data was that economy-wide sea changes in the 
balance of social forces take place over longer time frames 
than five years or so, and that the ECA was only pa11 of a 
longer swing in that balance in New Zealand. Hence I set 
out to look for signs of a turning of the tide in the early 
1980s. 
Implicit in my approach to the topic is provisional 
acceptance of the Ricardian hypothesis that in a growing 
economy not settled into a stationary state there is a degree 
of indeterminacy in the relative shares of labour and capital 
in the product, over a range bounded by the ·'subsistence 
wage rate" and the zero-investment threshold rate of return. 
A second possible hypothesis which I failed to frame at 
the outset was implicit in our 1983 discussion of a 
hypothetical profit squeeze: 
A rise in the real wage which increases the 
labour share of the social product may squee:e 
the profit share, and thereby force down the 
rate ofprofit. {One of] the conditions for this 
to occur {is} ... that the squeeze affects profits 
rather than the shares of the State or 
foreigners ... 
The reference to 'foreigners ' indicates that when referring 
to 'profits' we were thinking of the profits secured by 
domestically-resident capitalists, as distinct from capitalists 
in general. However it is clear from the context of the 
passage just quoted that the profitability of domestic capital 
can potentially be squeezed from three directions, not just 
by wage push. An increasing tax wedge had clearly been 
a feature of the 1970s and contributed to the passionate 
business advocacy of tax cuts in the 1980s. A rising share 
of profits captured by foreign interests could also squeeze 
the economic surplus accruing to domestic owners and 
hence make economic growth increasingly dependent upon 
the willingness of foreign interests to plow profits back 
into New Zealand in preference to alternative opportunities 
elsewhere in the global economy. This, as will be seen, 
turns out to be an important, albeit unplanned, conclusion 
of this study. 
Some Numbers 
We begin by disaggregating total factor payments (GDP 
at factor cost) among the three familiar national-accounts 
aggregates 'compensation of employees' (that is, wages 
and salaries), 'depreciation', and the residual ·operating 
surplus' which is as close as the current SNA national ac-
Figure 1. Pre-Direct-Tax Shares of GDP at Factor Cost 
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counts take us to a profit share. Figure I shows the pic-
ture,. The data are from Table A5.1 which together with 
the appendices are available from the author. 
The motivation for my initial hypothesis is immediately 
evident from this chru1. The pre-tax data for wages and 
surplus (which includes profits, rents, and other 
components such as self-employed incomes and imputed 
rents of owner-occupied housing) ret1ect, as McDonald 
had argued, an apparent wages-led squeeze on profits' in 
the 1970s reversed by a swing in the other direction after 
1982. The wages share began the 1960s at 50%, rose to 
62% by 1982, and had been driven back down to 54% by 
the end of the 1990s. There is no break in the trend at the 
time of the ECA. 
Old hands will immediately know, however, not to trust 
these high-level SNA aggregates, especially conside1ing 
the mixed bag of income claims that go into 'operating 
surplus'. It is essential to disaggregate the data further. 
A first step in this direction is to separate out the growing 
wedge of direct taxation on both capital and labour. This 
changes the picture to that in Figure 2 (for data see Table 
A5.2). 
In after-tax (income) terms, in the two decades before 1982 
the labour share more or less held its own, but with no 
upward trend to match that of the pre-tax (product) wage 
seen in Figure I. The after-tax wage share was 44.7% in 
1962, 43.2% in 1972, and 44.0% in 1981 prior to the 
Freeze. Thereafter the after-tax wage and salary share came 
under sustained downward pressure, falling to 34.4% by 
1996, after which it stabilised at the new lower level. There 
is no break in trend conesponding to passage of the ECA. 
After-tax operating surplus was clearly squeezed (by the 
State rather than organised labour) during the two dec-
ades prior to 1982. The surplus share fell from a peak of 
32.6 in 1962 to a trough of22.7% in 1981, following which 
it rebounded back to 31% by I 994 and has stabilised at 
that level since. 
In summary, the combined after-tax share of direct factor 
claims as represented by the two major national-accounts 
aggregates dropped from about 83% to 75% by the early 
1980s as the tax wedge widened, then stabilised and picked 
up slightly to about 77-78% by the end of the 1990s. The 
squeeze went first onto operating surplus in the 1970s, 
then was progressively transferred to after-tax wages and 
salaries from the early-mid 1980s. Figure 3 shows the 
trends in the two shares. Here again there is some supp011 
for the hypothesis of a change in conjuncture adversely 
affecting the wage share from the early-mid 1980s through 
the 1990s, with a loss of about 10% of GDP to the other 
claimants contained within the national accounts aggregates 
Figure 2. After-Tax Shares of GDP at Factor Cost 
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Figure 3. Shares of After-Tax Compensation of Employees and After-Tax 
Operating Surplus in GDP 
:no 
45.0 
LO.O 
~ 35.0 V> 
0 
0 
0 
...... 
:no 
0 
~ 
~ 25.0 ~ 
0... 
Cl 
o :no 
....... 
0 
~ 15.0 
10.0 
5.0 
' depreciation' and 'operating surplus.' 
To say anything satisfactory about the profit share, we have 
to break down the undifferentiated re s idual called 
' operating surplus'. Included in this component are self-
employed income. imputed rents on owner-occupied 
housing, profits earned by overseas owners of New Zealand 
ftrms, errors and omissions, and residual profits and rents 
flowing to domestic capitalists. Table A5.3 presents a 
provisional decomposition, with errors <md omissions still 
remaining hidden inside the after-tax surplus accruing to 
domestic capitalists. Figure 4 plots the results and draws 
attention immediately to the expansion of overseas profits 
and owner-occupied housing relative to the other 
components of Operating Surplus. 
Table A5.4 then shows the components of gross surplus as 
percentages of GDP at Factor Cost and the results are 
plotted in Figure 5. The recovery of gross surplus from 
38% of GDP in 1981 to 49% by 1994 is immediately 
apparent. 
d 
In Figure 5 it is apparent that the three growing shares 
within operating surplus were depreciation, owner-
occupied housing, and foreign profits. Depreciation is 
appropriately netted out before looking seriously at factor 
shares; I have left it in up to this point only because the 
national-accounts estimate for depreciation is notional only, 
and for some purposes it is better to look at the gross surplus 
given that this is the primary source of finance for gross 
investment. We have, however, no way of decomposing 
• After-tax 
corrpensation of 
enployees 
1o After-tax 
operating surplus 
depreciation between domestic and foreign owned assets 
and in Table A5.5 and Figure 6 it is taken out to leave 
shares of NDP at factor cost. 
The imputed rentals on owner-occupied housing represent 
not actual production in each period, but simply a proxy 
for the welfare gained by home owners in the sense of not 
having to pay house rent out of their actual factor income 
receipts. Its increase from 2.8% of NDP in 1981 to 8.5% 
by 1999 ret1ects the rise in house prices and market rents 
relative to other prices in the economy, rather than an 
increase in its share of the annual flow of real resources 
and product. Its inclusion in operating surplus potentially 
distorts the picture, since our interest is primarily in the 
share of net profit accming to capitalists engaged in market 
production using wage labour. Therefore in Table A5.6 
and Figure 7 owner-occupied housing has been taken out, 
leaving the profits of capitalists and the business incomes 
of the self-employed. 
In a final step, the self-employed are excluded for Figme 
8, which shows the profits share as usually understood in 
classical growth theory. We now find that there was no 
squeeze on profits in this sense during the 1960s and 1 970s 
according to these figures; on the contrary, the pre-tax profit 
share rose from 20.3% in 1960 to over 25% for much of 
the 1970s, before falling to 21% in 1981. Much of this 
apparent fall reflects the change in statistical procedure 
when SNA accounts began in 1978, so one should not read 
~ 
anything too dramatic into the period around 1980. 
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Figure 4. Decomposition of Operating Surplus: $ million 
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Figure 6. Operating Surplus Components as % of NDP 
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Clearly since the early 1980s the profit share has held 
steady but has exhibited pro-cyclical t1uctuations, rising 
in booms and falling in recessions. Two features stand out 
starkly from Figure 8, however, firstly the structural reforms 
which began in the mid- 1980s had no apparent effect on 
the aggregate profit share over the long haul. Insofar as 
the profit-squeeze diagnosis of slow economic growth had 
any force in the early 1980s, there has been no 
redistribution towards capital since then, which might 
suggest that one of the necessary conditions for reviving 
capitalist growth - a rising share of net profit - has been 
~issing in New Zealand. This is all the more intriguing 
gaven the apparently sustained political offensive against 
w_ages and salaries throughout the period, seen earlier in 
Fagure 3. It now emerges that the apparent oains to :·surplu~" in Figure 3 were due to rising house prices, not 
amprovmg real profitability in production. 
11le second major stylised fact to emeroe from Fioure 8 is the ne · . . ,::, b 
ar-euthanasxa of domesttc capital as the dereoulation 
of capital markets d . . . , o 
. an pnvattsatxon of state assets have 
&hafted large s h f . . 
. wat es o the economy mto foretgn 
ownershap Th ft . ~ 
· e a er-tax proftt share of overseas owners ~ook the share of domestic capital decisively in 1995 
-.. 
15 ~rrently running at 9-10% ofNDP excluding owner-
-..upaed housing c d . ~ Clpilal . • ompare Wtth 7-8% for domestic :C::.C~ch had had_ a 21% sh~e in the 1970s. For 
.'Pedal 1 . on the notion that national capital has some 
robee 10 a development and growth process this trend 
~~~IU cause ~ . ' 
or consternatlOn. Even in an era of 
lll&&&alllon, the qu · 
estlon naturally arises whether there 
is any behavioural difference between foreigners and local 
capitalists in the ways they allocate their locally-captured 
profits. Clearly the immediate future of economic growth 
in New Zealand now lies in the hands of foreign investors ~ 
to an extent that would have been unthinkable twenty years 
ago. 
~ 
The rising share of profits to overseas owners in Figure 8 
is, of course, simply the story of the balance of payments 
cun·ent account in the 1990s - indeed, our estimate of that 
share was obtained using the balance of payments series 
for "property and entrepreneurial income to rest of world". 
There is a whole story to be told about the relationship 
between the accrual of those profits in the balance of 
payments statistics, and their actual disposition between 
repatriation and acquisition of New Zealand dollar-
denominated assets. That, however, is the subject for 
another paper. 
Conclusions 
There are four main conclusions we can draw from the 
above. Firstly the share of wages and salaries has unequivo-
cally fallen through the period of free-market reforms, but 
the Employment Contracts Act looks to have been simply 
a symptom of the general trend, not a significant event in 
its own right. 
Secondly the profit share, in the sense of company profits 
accruing to domestic and foreign owners of corporate en-
terprises, has barely changed over the past half-century 
(allowing for the one-off statistical shift in 1978 when the 
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national accounts methodology changed). The profit share 
moves pro-cyclically, and the past twenty years have wit-
nessed a massive transfer of the economy's profits flow 
out of the hands of local owners and into foreign hands, to 
the point where domestic capitalists are now minority par-
ticipants in the aggregate profit share. 
incomes had such a poor payoff in terms of 
-~PIIi:llllt, 
rejuvenation. In addition, the era of radical attempts 
wither the State left the tax wedge on factor incomes~ 
general virtually unchanged. 111 
Notes 
The third conclusion is that the self-employed income suf- 1 
fered a massive squeeze ti·om the early 1960s to the late 
1970s (down from 19% to 7% ofNDP excluding owner-
occupied housing, in after-tax terms- see Table A5.6) and 
has rebounded only slightly in the 1990s (back to 9% ). 
Fourthly, most of the apparent rise in the share of operat- 2 
ing surplus is attributable to rising house prices and a cor-
responding increase in the share of imputed rents. Conse-
quently, reclassification of self-employed business income 3 
and owners-occupied housing can quite radically change 
the picture of the distribution of the total net product among 4 
the four claimants Labour, the State, Foreign Capital, and 
Domestic Capital. See Figures 9-11. 5 
Future Research 
The implications of changing factor shares for economic 
growth remain an intriguing topic for further investigation. 
The era of a falling wage share from 1982 on corresponded 
to a period of rising unemployment and slow growth. 6 
However, the failure of the profit share to rise as the labour 
share fell may help to explain why the squeeze on labour 
McDonald ( 1978); Rosenberg ( 1980). Discussion 
of the significance of these papers, together with a 
survey of the subsequent "real wage debate" up to 
the early 1990s, is in Chapple (1993) Chapter 8 
pp.170-1 89. East on ( 1990) also provides a survey. 
Edgren et al (1973) quoted in McDonald (1978) 
pp.6-7. 
McDonald ( 1978) p.17 and p.24. 
McDonald (1978) p.9. 
Rima (1996) p.31 0 argues, using US data 1929-
1990, that "when institutional changes are taken 
into account, the wage share remains constant in 
the range of 73 to 76.8 percent". The data are for 
wage costs faced by employers, inclusive of tax 
and social security. 
Cf Rowthorn ( 1980). 
Figure 9. The Four Claimants with Self-Employed Treated as "Labour" 
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Figure 10. The Four Claimants with Self-Employed Treated as "Capitalists" 
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Figure 11. The Four Claimants with Self-Employed and House Owners 
Treated as "Capitalists" 
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See for example Maloney (1994), (1998); Maloney 
and Savage (1996). The empirical findings 
amounted to potential corroboration for Bowley's 
Law- the ·'surprise" referred to was among those 
who believed that labour organisation could affect 
the distribution of factor incomes. Rima ( 1996) 
p.310 says bluntly that "there is no evidence, either 
historically or at present, that collective bargaining 
has raised the wage share" (in the USA). 
See Appendix 4 (available on request from author) 
for further discussion of the Ricardo model. 
9 Bertram and Wells ( 1983) p.85. 
10 
11 
The Appendix is available on request from the 
author. 
This obviously has to be qualified by the 
observation that labour was able to pass through a 
rising tax rate entirely to the purchasers of labour, 
which implies either a subsistence floor to the 
income wage rate, or costless migration to an 
external labour market which determined the New 
Zealand income wage rate, or the exercise of some 
degree of market power by labour. 
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